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ABSTRACT
The intelligibility of initiative proposals is of utmost importance in case of direct democratic decisions. 
This study sums up the tools by means of which voters are informed about referendum issues in countries or 
states with well developed direct democratic traditions, like Switzerland, Oregon and California. A special 
attention is paid to ballot pamphlets and requirements regarding the wording of the proposal. The second 
part of the study focuses on Hungary. Ballot pamphlets are not in use here, the practice of the authorities 
is centred on the “requirement of the unambiguity of the question”. Based on an analysis of the resolutions 
of the National Election Committee, the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Curia (Supreme 
Court) of Hungary, the authors demonstrate that the requirement of unambiguity has become an obligation 
of initiators which is very difficult to comply with. The study finally recommends possible solutions in order 
to make the tool of bottom-up initiative a more practicable instrument of direct democracy in Hungary.
Key words: direct democracy, referendum, popular initiative, voters’ competence, intelligibility 
of referendum issues, ballot pamphlet, Hungary, Switzerland, Oregon, California
INTRODUCTION
Among the various institutions of direct democracy – by direct democracy are 
meant here procedures in which citizens may decide or express their opinions on 
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policy issues directly at the ballot box – mechanisms triggered by the citizens them-
selves are often denoted with attributes like “bottom-up” or “citizen-initiated” and 
contrasted with “top-down” instruments, i.e. direct democratic procedures launched 
by authorities [cf. Altman 2011: 2, 8].
The two types – “top-down” and “bottom-up” mechanisms – may have significantly 
different functions. Although top-down instruments may well have a place in the toolbar 
of a constitutional state, they easily become dubious tools in the hands of those in power: 
the plebiscites held during the Napoleonic era are historic examples of this usage. Both 
Napoléon Bonaparte and his nephew, Charles-Louis Napoléon Bonaparte repeatedly 
deployed this instrument in order to legitimize unconstitutional acts, to circumvent the 
parliament or to strengthen themselves in their own political position [cf. Frei 1995]. 
These uses of direct popular votes clearly testify that the vote is not always the sole and 
most important determinant of a decision. The authority to formulate the question and 
to set the date for the vote may be just as much significant for the outcome.
This latter observation is true for “bottom-up” mechanisms as well. Those few ini-
tiators who are able to collect enough signatures in order to launch a direct democratic 
decision-making process at the end of which the final word will be spoken by the voters 
are equally in a powerful position: they can place an issue on the political agenda and 
determine the common theme for months. It is no accident that such mechanisms are 
often tools in the hands of those being in opposition. By them they try to exert a control 
over the governing majority and to put through interests that would otherwise be lost in 
the labyrinth of parliamentary decision-making. Under modern constitutionalism, the 
practice of bottom-up mechanisms first showed significant development in Switzerland 
in the second half of the 19th century [Trechsel, Kriesi 1996: 185–192; Serdült 2018: 
49–56]. Swiss institutions of direct democracy were adopted in many of the western 
member states of the USA from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries [Auer 1989: 
83–92]. In Europe, the interwar period has brought the first spread of direct democratic 
mechanisms that could be triggered by the citizens [Komáromi 2014: 55–57].
THE VOTERS’ COMPETENCE
One of the counter-arguments, often referred to by opponents of direct democra-
cy, is the competence of the voters. Direct popular decisions on policy issues usually 
require more information than average citizens normally have. If they want to cast 
their votes in a reasonable manner, they have to make efforts in order to increase 
their knowledge about the issue. Gathering information may cost time, energy, some-
times money as well and surveys show that far not every citizen is ready to pay the 
price of being informed. Some of them remain absent from voting, others cast their 
votes based on the directives given by parties and opinion leaders they trust. Even 
so, a significant part of the electorate enters the poll-stations without well-founded 
and complex knowledge on the subject put to referendum. Voters may particularly 
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be overcharged if they have to vote on multiple issues at the same time [cf. Möckli 
1994: 186–189, 218–221; Milic, Rousselot, Vatter 2014: 271–276, 283–284].
Bottom-up direct democratic procedures are faced with the challenge of the 
citizen’s competence twice. Not only citizens who will cast their votes at the final 
stage of the process shall have enough knowledge but also those who trigger this 
process: the initiative group and the citizens who sign the signature collection sheets. 
(Henceforth the term “initiators” will denote the “initiative group”: those few peo-
ple, who start the direct democratic process, hand in their request to the competent 
authority – if there is any – and organise the collection of signatures.) Even if the 
initiative is only intended to reject or abolish a law that was already passed by the 
parliament (this is usually called facultative or optional referendum), initiators shall 
know the procedural preconditions of their request, the parts and technical details 
of the process. If the initiative is not directly meant to reject or abolish an existing 
regulation but to adopt a new one (this can be called popular initiative – cf. Altman 
2011: 11), the knowledge requirement is even higher on the side of the initiators. 
They have to prepare their own proposal on how to change the status quo. Such 
initiatives may have the form of detailed drafts or general proposals1 (or questions 
of principle). Detailed drafts require specialized knowledge not only about the issue 
itself but also on the existing normative framework and on how legal regulations shall 
be formulated. Also in case of general proposals initiators must be acquainted with 
the norms that are related to the issue in question. They must know if their intent can 
be realized under the current scheme of international and constitutional regulations.
The knowledge of initiators and the competence of voters are not independent 
from one another. If initiators want to convince citizens to support their concern, 
they have to provide information about the issue. This can happen through different 
channels of campaign communication and finally, the text of their initiative itself 
may be decisive as well. They must, therefore, formulate the latter with regard to 
the supposed intellectual level of voters. On the other hand, voters usually rely 
on the information provided by the initiators. In addition to a variety of campaign 
materials, the initiative text should therefore also include the essentials of the issue, 
the goal of the initiative, in a clear and – as far as possible – understandable form.
THE INFORMATION OF VOTERS: EXAMPLES FROM SWITZERLAND,  
OREGON AND CALIFORNIA
But what may be the role of legal regulations in increasing the knowledge of 
citizens? How, by means of what rules or institutions, can legal systems support the 
endeavour to inform the electorate about a subject-matter submitted to popular vote? 
1  This is the case, for example, in Switzerland on the federal level – cf. Federal Constitution of the 
Swiss Confederation, Art. 139(2).
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It is clear that regulations and institutions alone cannot guarantee a well-informed 
citizenry. There are, however, examples which show that certain rules or institutions 
may indirectly work towards an electorate conversant in the topics put to referendum. 
We only shortly mention here the educational system, which should, very generally, 
prepare prospective voters for turning with interest to matters of the public, enable 
them to collect and critically select information on the most important political 
affairs and to draw and maybe also share their own conclusions, being ready for 
conversation with others.
CAMPAIGN REGULATIONS
On a more concrete level, also campaign regulations may serve the purpose 
of increasing voters’ information. The core aim of such regulations is to secure 
a “level playing field” in which interests and arguments of all affected groups can 
be articulated and transmitted to the citizenry with equal chances. The solutions are 
manifold and they relate either to the financial background of referendum campaigns 
or to the fair access to media or both. Mandatory disclosure or reporting of campaign 
expenditures, restrictions on public or private campaign spending, public subsidy 
of the main sides, free television or radio slots for parties and equal newspaper and 
news portal advertisements – maybe these are the most important tools by means of 
which the fairness of the campaign activity is tried to be secured [Beramendi et al. 
2008: 152–156]. However, it is also clear that the effectiveness of such measures is 
largely dependent on the actual media conditions and the distribution of financial 
and political power resources in a given country. What can be expected is a more or 
less balanced information covering the campaign messages of the most important 
political sides rather than accurate, extensive and neutral information on the issue.
BALLOT PAMPHLETS
An even more effective tool can be if an official but possibly impartial body is 
entrusted with providing information on the initiative, its complex background and 
possible consequences. In California, for example, it is the Secretary of State who is 
responsible for preparing and publishing the “Voter Information Guide” (or “Ballot 
Pamphlet”) before every public vote on ballot propositions (initiative or referendum 
measures to be submitted before the electorate for approval or rejection). The Voter 
Information Guide includes the title of the proposition, a short summary of it ex-
plaining what a “yes” or a “No” vote would mean, an analysis by the Legislative 
Analyst expounding the meaning and possible fiscal effects of the proposition, the 
arguments of the groups supporting and opposing the proposition and the rebuttals 
of the other side, finally, the elaborated text of the proposition, which is a detailed 
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draft law.2 “Voters’ Pamphlets” (or “Voters’ Guides”) in Oregon cover essentially the 
same content, the explanatory statements are, however, elaborated by a committee 
of five persons (two proponents, two opponents and one chosen by them), and the 
estimate of financial impact statement is prepared by another committee including the 
Secretary of State, the State Treasurer and further office holders3 [cf. Möckli 2007: 
28–29; Beramendi et al. 2008: 157]. In Switzerland, the Federal Council shall inform 
voters about federal ballot propositions (initiatives and referendums) in accordance 
with the “principles of completeness, objectivity, transparency and proportionality”.4 
The federal voters’ booklet (Abstimmungsbüchlein) is edited by the Federal Chan-
cellery and shall include the text of the ballot paper and the initiative, the arguments 
of the initiators, the most important views represented in the parliamentary debate, 
the explanations of the Federal Council and its eventual recommendations (the latter 
should not diverge from the position of the Federal Assembly). Although the absolute 
impartiality and objectivity of the information provided in such guides, pamphlets 
and booklets can hardly be guaranteed (even if their content and wording is subject 
to judicial review), it is well understandable that such materials tend to give more 
insight into the essence of an issue than vague campaign slogans usually do.
REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO THE WORDING OF THE INITIATIVE
Last but not least, regulations pertaining to the wording of the ballot question 
may also promote the goal that voters understand the issue which was submitted 
before the electorate for approval or rejection. Most jurisdictions have rules on how 
to formulate the question – or the short explanatory statement – in order to assure 
that it is clear, unambiguous and does not deceive voters. In Switzerland, the Federal 
Council is authorised to “amend or reject defamatory, blatantly false or excessively 
long statements” [PRA Art. 11(2)]. It is laid down further that in case of a popular 
initiative for the partial revision of the Federal Constitution, the initiative shall 
either “take the form of a general proposal or of a specific draft of the provisions 
proposed”. Initiatives shall comply with the requirement of the consistency of form, 
which means that it may not combine the general proposal form with a specific draft. 
They shall observe the requirement of the consistency of the subject matter as well 
(“single-subject rule”).5 The latter means that the initiative may only be related to 
one area field, or if the proposal affects two or more factual questions or subject 
2  The voter information guides are available on the California Secretary of State’s website as well: 
https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/voter-information-guides/ (access: 11.06.2019).
3  See menu entry “Measures” at http://oregonvotes.gov/voters-guide/english/votersguide.html 
(access: 11.06.2019).
4  See Federal Act on Political Rights (PRA) of 17 December 1976 (Status as of 1 November 2015), 
Art. 10a(2).
5  Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, Art. 139(2-3).
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matters, they may not be connected with each other in a way that voters would not 
have the freedom to choose between them. If the proposal involves more factual is-
sues or matters, they shall be coherent, have an intrinsic connection with one another 
and be aimed at the same goal.6 If an initiative violates the principle of the unity of 
form or the single-subject rule, the Federal Assembly may declare it to be invalid 
in whole or in part. Nevertheless, no initiative has been declared invalid because 
of the infringement of the consistency of form and only two were declared invalid 
because of the violation of the single-subject rule (1977 and 1995), thus, the Federal 
Assembly’s attitude is very generous [cf. Moeckli 2017: 220–221].
The Constitution of Oregon pronounces that “(…) [a]n initiative petition shall in-
clude the full text of the proposed law or amendment to the Constitution. A proposed 
law or amendment to the Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters 
properly connected therewith” [Art. IV, Sec. 1(2)d.]. Thus, the single-subject rule 
is in force here as well. Further requirements are related to the form of the ballot 
title and the explanatory statement (mostly regarding their length). The statement 
shall be “simple and understandable” and “of not more than 25 words that describe 
the result if the state measure is approved”; it shall “not describe existing statutory 
or constitutional provisions in a way that would lead an average elector to believe 
incorrectly that one of those provisions would be repealed by approval of the state 
measure, if approval would not have that result”. It is laid down further that the same 
terms shall be used for describing the same thing or action “to the extent practical”. 
Since voters usually cast their votes on more than one ballot propositions at the same 
election, it is also required, that, “(…) [t]o avoid confusion, a ballot title shall not 
resemble any title previously filed for a measure to be submitted at that election”.7
The single-subject rule is also included in the Constitution of California: “(…) 
[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to 
the electors or have any effect” [Art. 2, Sec. 8(d)]. The initiative shall also here set 
forth “the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution” [Art. 2, 
Sec. 8(b)]. The title, the summary of the chief purpose and points of the initiative 
are formulated by the Attorney General. Detailed rules determine the form of the 
proposed initiative measures (e.g. length, type and size of the letters) and the man-
datory content of the ballot pamphlets. The first version of the latter shall be made 
available for public examination and it is subject to judicial review, which may be 
initiated by any elector. A peremptory writ of mandate shall be issued upon clear 
and convincing proof that the ballot pamphlet is false or misleading, thus, the court 
may order the Secretary of State to correct or amend it.8
6  Judgement 1P.223/2006 of 12 September 2006 of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (2.).
7  Oregon Statute 250.035, (1)-(2), (6).
8  California Statute 9092.
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INTERIM SUMMARy: CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON REFERENDUMS
The above examples show that in Switzerland both general proposals and de-
tailed drafts, in Oregon and California, however, only detailed drafts – i.e. text of 
laws or constitutional amendments – can be qualified as popular initiatives. (The 
latter form is preferred by initiators in Switzerland as well – cf. Linder 2005: 253.) 
Apart from substantial limits that are not presented here (like the Swiss require-
ment that initiatives shall not infringe mandatory provisions of international law) 
the central element of the provisions regarding these texts is the single-subject 
rule. Since the in-depth understanding of sometimes quite complicated legal texts 
should not evidently be expected from all citizens, ballot pamphlets that explain 
the content of these texts are reasonable concomitants of the initiatives. The re-
quirements of accuracy and understandability are usually related to the content 
of these complementary materials. In order to provide balanced information, the 
regulation lays down that both proponents and opponents may have a claim to the 
presentation of their arguments.
It is worth mentioning that the European Commission for Democracy Through 
Law (Venice Commission) also laid down guidelines in its “Code of Good Practice 
on Referendums” regarding the understandability of referendum issues. According 
to this, authorities must provide objective information implying not only the text 
submitted to a referendum but also “an explanatory report or balanced campaign 
material from the proposal’s supporters and opponents” [Venice Commission 2006: 
8]. The Code’s explanatory memorandum makes a difference between four forms 
of texts submitted to referendum: (1) specifically-worded draft, (2) the repeal of 
an existing provision, (3) question of principle and (4) generally-worded proposal 
[Venice Commission 2006: 20]. In connection with the “procedural validity of texts 
submitted to a referendum” the Code specifies three requirements: (1) the unity of 
form (specifically-worded drafts should not be combined with generally-worded 
proposals or questions of principle), (2) the unity of content (“there must be an in-
trinsic connection between the various parts of each question put to the vote” in order 
not to compel voters “to accept or refuse as a whole provisions without an intrinsic 
link”; this does not apply, however, to total revisions of a text or changes of several 
chapters of a text), and (3) the unity of hierarchic level (“the same question should 
not simultaneously apply to legislation of different hierarchic level”; the explanatory 
memorandum classifies this as “not as crucial” as the previous two). The Code also 
lays down that in order to prevent invalid referendums, an authority shall be enabled 
to correct faulty drafting “when the question is obscure, misleading or suggestive”. 
In case the procedural validity has been violated, this authority should declare the 
text partially invalid if the remaining text is coherent [Venice Commission 2006: 
12–13, 20–21].
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REFERENDUMS IN HUNGARy: THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Since the adoption of the first law on national referendums in 19899 Hungarian 
voters have been enabled to initiate national referendums and, if their initiative fulfils 
the legal conditions, the holding of the referendum is mandatory. According to Art. 
8(1) of the Basic Law of Hungary, the Parliament shall order a national referendum 
at the initiative of at least 200,000 voters. (It may order a referendum if the initiative 
came from the President of the Republic, the Government or 100,000 voters.) Deta-
iled rules are laid down by Act CCXXXVIII of 2013 on Initiating Referendums, the 
European Citizens’ Initiative and Referendum Procedure (henceforth: Referendum 
Act). The Hungarian regulation does not make a difference between facultative refe-
rendums, which are aimed at repealing an existing regulation and popular initiatives, 
which have the intention to enact a new regulation, but generally, both are possible.
Initiatives shall pass through a certification process at the National Election 
Committee (NEC). In case of a bottom-up initiative also a preliminary check is 
carried out by the National Election Office (NEO). Initiators first have to hand in 
the question they want to submit to referendum to the NEO, which examines if this 
petition fulfils the formal requirements, if it is in line with the constitutional functions 
of referendums and if another referendum process on the same issue is not already 
underway (the regulation excludes concurrent procedures). If these conditions are 
fulfilled, the NEO submits the initiative to the NEC for certification. The NEC checks 
the fulfilment of both formal and substantive requirements. The NEC examines (1) if 
the question falls within the competence of the Parliament; (2) if it does not concern 
any prohibited issue enlisted in Art. 8(3) of the Basic Law; (3) if the question was 
submitted according to the provisions of the Referendum Act; (4) if the question is 
unambiguous; and (5) if there is no other referendum procedure in progress on the 
same issue. If any of these circumstances cannot be ascertained, the NEC declines 
to certify the question, otherwise it certifies it and the collection of signatures can 
be started. The decisions of the NEC regarding the certification of the question are 
subject to judicial review by the Curia (Supreme Court) of Hungary. Prior to 2012 it 
was the Constitutional Court, which played the same role (now it only may intervene 
in the process exceptionally).
As regards the information of citizens, Hungarian regulation is quite restrained. 
There are rules on the conduct of referendum campaigns, which are basically aimed 
at ensuring equal opportunities for initiators and parliamentary parties to publish or 
release political advertisements in the broadcastings of media service providers (cf. 
e.g. Referendum Act, Art. 69). Regarding ballot pamphlets or similar explanatory 
documents no provisions are available in Hungarian regulation; the posters of the 
NEO usually cover rather technical details on the time and place of the vote and the 
different deadlines; the question submitted to referendum is usually also indicated 
9  Act XVII of 1989 on Referendum and Popular Initiative.
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without any explanation. Other posters sometimes provide information on how to 
cast a valid vote. In addition to this, informatory announcements or leaflets have been 
released in the past with procedural information.10 The announcement on the 2008 
national referendum consisted, for example, of four pages and involved the questions 
put to referendum, a description on how to register for voting at another polling-
station or abroad, on how to request a mobile poll, on the validity requirements and 
the availability of the voting information services in the different counties.11
Provisions on the unambiguity of the question submitted to referendum have 
been present in the regulations since 1989. Art. 25(1) of Act XVII of 1989 laid down, 
for example, that “(…) [t]he question(s) to be put to referendum shall be worded 
in such manner, which enables all citizens to answer unambiguously”. The current 
formulation in Art. 9(1) of the Referendum Act stipulates: “The question proposed for 
referendum shall be worded in such manner that it allows a straightforward response, 
and permits the Parliament to decide – on the basis of the outcome of the referen-
dum – whether it has the obligation to make a law, and if so, what kind of a law”.12 
Section (2) adds that “(…) [t]he question proposed for referendum shall not contain 
any obscene expression or any other expression shocking in any other way”. What 
an unambiguous question or a straightforward response means is, however, not laid 
down in-detail in the regulation. It was much more the judicial practice – until 2011 
that of the Constitutional Court and since that the decisions of the Curia (Supreme 
Court) of Hungary – which determined the aspects to be examined. These aspects 
or requirements are usually denoted with the general term “the unambiguity of the 
question” [cf. Szabó 2007: 100–101]. In the followings we will sum up the most 
important elements of the judicial practice.
THE UNAMBIGUITy OF THE QUESTION AS A REQUIREMENT IN HUNGARy
The Constitutional Court first addressed the problem of unambiguity in 2011. 
In its decision 32/2001. (VII. 11.) it had to decide on the certification of the specimen 
of a signature collection sheet, which involved four matters including holidays for 
employees, the increase of pensions, the abolition of the mandatory military service 
and the gratis language exam for students in the secondary school. The Court pro-
nounced that the political right to referendum includes the opportunity for voters to 
clearly indicate, which questions do they propose for referendum. Since the signature 
collection sheet did not make this possible, the sheet was declared unconstitutional. 
This decision basically applied the single-subject rule outlined above when it made 
10  https://static.valasztas.hu/nepszav08/hu/17/17_4.html (access: 11.06.2019).
11  https://static.valasztas.hu/nepszav08/hu/17/szorolap.pdf (access: 11.06.2019).
12  We henceforth use the English translation available at the website of NEO, sometimes with amen-
dments: https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/act-ccxxxviii-of-2013-on-initiating-refe-
rendums-the-european-citizens-initiative-and-referendum-procedure (access: 11.06.2019).
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clear that questions relating to essentially different subject matters may not be on 
the same signature collection sheet.
In a next case the question relating to the increase of pensions was put already on 
one single signature collection sheet: “Do you agree that in addition to the increase 
of salaries also the increase of the prices, based on the consumption (consumer ba-
sket) of pensioners, should be taken into consideration when determining the yearly 
increase of pensions?” In its decision 51/2001. (XI. 29.) the Court laid down that 
the unambiguity of the question requires that it should be answerable with “yes” 
or “No”, it must be clear and understandable only in one way. Initiators are not 
obliged to use the technical terms of the different branches of law. It added further 
that the requirement of unambiguity also means that the Parliament should know 
whether it is, as a result of a successful referendum, obliged to pass legislation and 
if yes, what legislation. The Court has found that the question fulfilled these criteria.
Decision 52/2001. (XI. 29.) addressed a question on holidays: “Do you agree 
that the Labour Code should ensure two whole holidays per week for employees 
in a way that one of them falls on Sunday, and for work on holiday should be due 
increased salary?” In this case the Constitutional Court focused on the aspect of the 
single-subject rule. It pronounced that a question put to referendum may include 
more clauses or sub-questions. If, however, these are contradictory to one another, 
or their relation is not clear, they do not follow from one another or their content is 
not connected, this would mean the violation of the requirement of unambiguity and 
the political right to referendum. Based on this, the Court declared unconstitutional 
the initiative because it connected two sub-questions, which did not follow from 
each other: one relating to the holiday and another relating to the salary. It repeated 
further its statements delivered in the previous decisions.
These three decisions and especially the last one determined the framework for 
the later interpretations of the requirement of unambiguity. This requirement has two 
sides: (1) the unambiguity from the aspect of the voter and (2) the unambiguity from 
the aspect of the Parliament. Each of these aspects originally embraced two tests:
(1) Unambiguity for the voter:
A. Is the question clear and understandable for the voter?
B. Is the question answerable by the voter with “yes” or “No”?
(2) Unambiguity for the Parliament:
A. Is the Parliament able to decide whether it has an obligation to pass legislation 
based on the successful referendum? – And if yes,
B. is the Parliament able to decide with what content should it pass legislation?
The NEC, the Constitutional Court and from 2012 the Curia (Supreme Court) 
of Hungary later developed further criteria regarding both aspects (for a current 
overview on the practice of the Curia in Hungarian [see: Balogh 2015: 96–99]; in 
the following description we partly rely on this).
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UNAMBIGUITy FOR THE VOTER
The text submitted to referendum shall be a question and not a declarative sen-
tence. In 2010, for example, when an initiative was handed in with the following 
wording: “We agree that in Hungary there should be no Olympic games.” – this ini-
tiative was declared unconstitutional.13 The question to be submitted to referendum 
should be clearly answerable with “yes” or “No” and interpretable only in one way.14
A referendum may not be regarded as legitimate if voters cannot exactly know 
about what they shall cast a vote. The question may, therefore, not be misleading 
or deceptive. The question “Do you agree that the company register should include 
the actual owners of the companies?”, for example, was rejected because it falsely 
suggested that the company register does not keep records of the actual owners or 
their particulars would not be real.15
Voters shall be able to clearly see the consequences of their decision. A popular 
initiative on the exclusion of companies of public procurement procedures over an 
amount of 100 million forints, which are owned by the relative(s) of a mayor in 
office, was rejected because the question did not make clear if also companies were 
excluded in which the mayor’s relative only has a very small share. Being that the 
distribution and structure of shares may be manifold, voters would not be able to 
comprehend all possible consequences of their decision – said the Curia of Hungary.16
The question shall comply with the grammatical rules of the Hungarian language. 
The following question “Do you want snap parliamentary ellections in 2015?” was, 
for example, rejected by the NEC because it typed the word választás (“election”) 
incorrectly with two “l” letters (vállasztás – “ellection”).17 As the Curia laid down, the 
incorrect sequence of words, wrong conjugation or declension may cause obscurity to 
such an extent, which hinders voters from understanding the essence of the question.18
The question shall be clear to all. Initiators are not obliged to use the techni-
cal terms of different branches of law in the text of the question; the use of such 
technical terms will not necessarily make the question understandable for everyday 
citizens. A question, for example, which included a series of technical expressions 
of financial law, raised, according to the Curia, such problems of interpretation, 
which would have been understandable for experts only but not for average voters. 
Its certification was, therefore, rejected.19 The Curia rejected another initiative, which 
13  Decision 12/2010. (II. 4.) of the Constitutional Court.
14  Curia Knk.37.145/2013/3.
15  Curia Knk.IV.37.457/2015/3.
16  Curia Knk.IV.37.132/2016/4.
17  NEC resolution 128/2015.
18  NEC resolution 59/2017.
19  Curia Knk.IV.38.010/2015/2.
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proposed a complicated calculation method for the minimum wage, with almost the 
same explanation.20
The problem of complex questions covering more issues was already addressed in 
connection with decisions 32/2001. (VII. 11.) and 52/2001. (XI. 29.) of the Constitu-
tional Court. This problem has been occurred since that several times. An initiative, for 
example, which was aimed at the revision of the legality of loans based either on foreign 
currency or on Hungarian currency, and on suspending all proceedings of distraining that 
arose from them, was rejected by the NEC because – in addition to other arguments – it 
connected the revision of foreign currency-based and Hungarian forint-based loans.21
It is also problematic if the question may be interpreted in a way that contradicts 
the intention of the initiator. An initiative, for example, proposed to prohibit the es-
tablishment of public institutions in the Castle District in Buda, a territory included 
in the Word Heritage List of the UNESCO. The initiative was obviously directed 
against the relocation of the Chancellery from Pest to Buda, the wording of the qu-
estion did not make clear, however, how the prohibition would affect the Office of 
the President of the Republic, which has already been located in the Castle District 
for many years.22 The Curia rejected therefore this initiative.
UNAMBIGUITy FOR THE PARLIAMENT
In order to better understand this aspect, it must be made clear that successful 
referendums impose the obligation to the Parliament to implement the result of the 
vote. The decision of voters will not directly and automatically become a part of the 
Hungarian legal system: it is not effective law. The Parliament shall, therefore, adopt 
the appropriate law if the result of the referendum makes necessary the change of 
the legal status quo. From the perspective of this requirement it is clear, why it is 
important, that the Parliament knows whether a new legislative enactment is needed 
and if yes, with what content. This content should be, according to the practice, clear 
to the extent that enables the Parliament to decide, how the intention of voters shall 
be implemented. An initiative, for example, which required to lay down by law that 
renewable energy takes precedence over all other sources of energy in the energy 
consumption of citizens, was rejected by the Curia, because it did not make clear, ba-
sed on what criteria should renewable energy prevail and how the Parliament should 
implement this principle. This decision also referred to another requirement, namely 
that the decision of people shall be realizable and executable. Giving preference to 
renewable energy over other sources of energy is not only a question of intent, it also 
20  Curia Knk.IV.37.458/2015/3.
21  NEC resolution 45/2013.
22  Curia Knk.IV.37.356/2015/2.
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depends on Hungary’s natural endowments.23 In the explanation, the Curia explicitly 
made reference to a former decision of the Constitutional Court as well, in which 
the Court rejected an initiative that proposed to introduce gratis beer in restaurants. 
This initiative was not only unclear for citizens, since they could not foresee, who 
should then finally pay the price of gratis beer, but also for the Parliament, because 
in case the initiative was approved by the citizens, it would not know how to im-
plement the result.24
To how extreme conclusions the requirement of unambiguity can lead is 
shown by a resolution of the NEC on an initiative, which intended to ban to-
bacco shops within a 600 meter radius of schools educating less than 18-year-
old students. The NEC rejected the initiative with the reasoning that in case of 
a successful referendum the Parliament would not know from which part of the 
school the radius should be measured (from its fence or from its entrance and if 
yes, from which one) and whether the distance shall be understood as bee line 
or as walking distance. (The other part of the reasoning referred to the violation 
of the right to property.)25
An initiative laid down concrete rates of exchange for paying back foreign 
currency-based loans and proposed to apply these if it is favourable for debtors. 
The NEC rejected the certification of the question among other reasons because the 
question did not make clear how long these rates of exchange should be applicable: 
during the whole duration of the loan or only during one part of it. The NEC dec-
lared that the question determines the expected regulation only roughly and it does 
not lay down its concrete content, therefore, it is not in line with the requirement of 
unambiguity from the perspective of the Parliament.26
CONSEQUENCES IN THE LIGHT OF STATISTIC DATA
The above examples show that in the practice of the certification procedures 
of bottom-up initiatives new criteria are developed from time to time by the aut-
horities in addition to those which were laid down already in 2001. Some of these 
requirements may be well understandable and legitimate; it is, however, also clear 
that others are due to a wide interpretation of the requirement of unambiguity [cf. 
Kukorelli, Milánkovich, Szentgáli-Tóth 2018: 4, 11–12]. The result is, however, 
dubious: on the one hand, many unwise or unserious initiatives can be strained 
off before the collection of signatures could begin, on the other hand, however, 
the putting through of reasonable interests are sometimes hindered because of the 
23  Curia Knk.VII.37.336/2017/3.
24  Decision 26/2007. (IV. 25.) of the Constitutional Court.
25  NEC resolution 130/2013. (VIII. 7.).
26  NEC resolution 15/2013. (X. 31.).
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legal requirements. Based on a comprehensive overview of the NEC’s resolutions 
that were adopted about initiatives handed in between 1999 and 2018, out of 2,079 
initiatives only 265 (13%) were certified and 1,814 (87%) were rejected (see: Fi-
gure 1). Since 2010, the proportion of rejections increased higher than 90% and 
since 2014 it is close to 95%.27
Figure 1. The proportion of referendum initiatives certified and rejected by the National Election Commit-
tee between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 201828
Source: Gabriella Antalicz’s own study.
Among the reasons for rejections, the lack of unambiguity has the highest pro-
portion: approximately 56% (see: Figure 2).
27  Cf. the data provided by the NEO at https://www.valasztas.hu/orszagos-nepszavazasi-
kezdemenyezesek, “Statisztikák az elbírált népszavazási kezdeményezésekről” [“Statistics on the verification 
of referendum initiatives” (access: 11.06.2019)].
28  Research results based on the resolutions available on the website of the National Election Office. 
Revisions by the Constitutional Court or the Curia (Supreme Court) of Hungary were not taken into 
consideration (their proportion is insignificant). The total number of grounds for rejection is higher than the 
total number of rejections (Figure 1) because the NEC sometimes sets forth multiple grounds for rejection 
in one case.
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Figure 2. The proportion of different grounds for the rejection of initiatives in the practice of the National 
Election Committee between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 201829
Source: Gabriella Antalicz’s own study.
In the period between 2014 and 2017, the lack of unambiguity was set forth in 
the reasoning in case of 72% of the initiatives rejected by the NEC [Mécs 2018: 111]. 
This high proportion of ambiguous questions needs further explanation.
CONCLUSIONS I: POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
The above-mentioned criteria of the unambiguity of the question are partly 
contradictory. The extremely rigorous understanding of the single-subject rule, as 
expounded in decision 52/2001. (XI. 29.) of the Constitutional Court, goes far beyond 
the similar requirement of the Swiss, Oregonian or Californian regulations and it is 
also more strict than the recommendation of the Venice Commission. The text of the 
question may not involve two concerns, which do not follow necessarily from one 
another and could be decided separately. This means that only one-sentence questions 
may be qualified as valid initiatives. At the same time, it is expected that the question 
itself provides enough information for citizens to understand its meaning, foresee 
its consequences and for the Parliament to find the exclusive way of the implemen-
tation of the result. The question may not leave alternatives, because this would be 
classified as ambiguity. Complex issues, however, which require complicated rules, 
cannot, of course, be summed up in one single sentence.
29  Research results based on the explanations to be found in the resolutions of the NEC (resolutions 
available on the website of the NEO).
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The Hungarian requirements wrongly combine two different types of popular 
initiatives, which are separated in Switzerland (and even more clearly in the Code 
of Good Practice of the Venice Commission): the general proposal (or question 
of principle) and the detailed, specific draft. Unambiguity, as it is understood by 
Hungarian authorities, could normally be expected from detailed drafts. The strict 
interpretation of the single-subject rule expects it, however, from one single sen-
tence. One single sentence would be optimal for general suggestions or questions 
of principle. Nevertheless, in this case it should be accepted that the Parliament has 
a larger scope for action in the implementation of the result. Citizens only lay down 
the main direction and it is up to the legislator to decide how to reach the goal and 
to determine the details.
Last but not least, the Hungarian practice expects intelligibility and the clarity 
of consequences from one single sentence. The examples of Switzerland, Oregon 
and California make clear that this is nearly impossible. That is why they introduced 
different kinds of ballot pamphlets, which enable citizens to make a well-informed 
decision. Usually not the text of the initiative itself (which may be a complicated, 
detailed draft law), but the content of these ballot pamphlets should fulfil the criteria 
of understandability and provide balanced information. The Hungarian regulation 
and practice does not take into account this possibility, information materials of this 
kind are not prepared for voters.
CONCLUSIONS II: RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above observations it would be worth considering the followings:
The regulation should make a difference between initiatives in form of a general 
suggestion and in form of a detailed draft. The latter should be made possible (Her-
bert Küpper recommends the exclusivity of this form – cf. Küpper 2011: 32–33.); 
in case of the former the Parliament should be enabled to lay down the details at its 
own discretion.
Initiators should be offered official assistance for the appropriate wording of 
their initiative. This could especially be important in case of initiatives in the form 
of detailed drafts since that needs specialized knowledge in codification.
An option would be to empower NEC to correct the text of the initiative, if it is 
improvable. This improvement should be made subject to judicial review in order 
to ensure that the improved version does not change the original intention of the 
initiators.
Last but not least, appropriate forms for the information of citizens should be 
elaborated on the essence of the initiative and its possible consequences [cf. Petrétei 
2016: 11]. In this respect, the examples of Switzerland, Oregon and California may 
provide enough inspiration, including the question of legal remedies against false 
or unbalanced content of ballot pamphlets or similar materials.
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